Objectives: Change in reward processing and motivation may mediate the relationship between dopaminergic dysregulation and positive symptoms of schizophrenia.
| INTRODUCTION
Dysregulation of the neurotransmitter dopamine has long been linked with the symptoms of schizophrenia. One prominent hypothesis on the role of dopamine in the development of symptoms is that of aberrant salience. According to Kapur (2003) , dopaminergic dysregulation leads to the aberrant assignment of importance to, or salience of, external objects, and internal representations, such as thoughts. In turn, many of the consequent epiphenomena, or subjective experiences, require explanation in order to make sense of the world (Howes & Nour, 2016; Kapur, 2003) . These experiences and concomitant explanations constitute the positive symptoms of psychosis. Although not fully understood, many regard the reward system and motivation as key mediators in the link between dopaminergic dysregulation and psychosis (Kapur, 2003) . Dopaminergic firing is associated with processing of rewardrelated stimuli (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2011; Zhang, Doyon, Clark, Phillips, & Dani, 2009; Zweifel et al., 2009) . It is critical in the evaluation of appetitive (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010; Jahn, Nee, Alexander, & Brown, 2014; McNaughton, 2004; Salamone, Correa, Mingote, & Weber, 2005; Salamone, Cousins, & Snyder, 1997; Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, & Wit, 2011) and aversive (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009 ) stimuli and is involved in the production of motivated behaviour, as seen in reward-based learning paradigms. For example, sensitivity to reward or punishment (or reinforcer sensitivity; Corr & McNaughton, 2012) has been shown to influence motivated behaviour (Cooper, Duke, Pickering, & Smillie, 2014; Unger, Heintz, & Kray, 2012) . Contextual factors have also been implicated in motivated behaviour. Motivated behaviour is influenced by the likelihood and magnitude of associated reward (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Schultz, 2010) , whether gain or loss is immediate or delayed (Berridge, 2013; Smith et al., 2015) , and how much effort is required for a reward (Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & Green, 2009; Salamone & Correa, 2002) .
Schizophrenia is associated with anomalous reward-related behaviour and cognitive differences in reward processing, especially when tasks require adaptation to changing stimuli or value assessments. Differences include an impaired ability to adapt learning strategies based on changing contingencies (Waltz & Gold, 2007) , greater sensitivity to loss (Scholten, van Honk, Aleman, & Kahn, 2006) , and a preference for smaller, more immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards (Heerey, Robinson, McMahon, & Gold, 2007) . Behavioural differences include reduced willingness to expend effort for reward Reddy et al., 2015) , especially for larger, more likely rewards (Barch, Treadway, & Schoen, 2014; Gold et al., 2013) , and an increased willingness to expend effort on low-incentive outcomes (Fervaha, Graff-Guerrero, et al., 2013) . The difference in behaviour across high and low incentive scenarios may indicate impairments in effort-cost computation in schizophrenia (Fervaha, Graff-Guerrero, et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013) .
However, several limitations affect this literature. First, there is little if any research into if, or how, factors contributing to motivated behaviour relate to aberrant salience. Second, although some evidence has emerged consistent with the aberrant salience hypothesis of schizophrenia (Haralanova, Haralanov, Beraldi, Moller, & Hennig-Fast, 2012; Jensen et al., 2008; Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 2012) , findings are inconsistent. For example, although increased aberrant salience has been found in schizophrenia (Pankow et al., 2015) and those at risk of psychosis (Cicero, Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010) , other findings indicate no significant difference compared with unaffected individuals (Ceaser & Barch, 2016; Roiser et al., 2009) . Third, there is a dearth of evidence that diverse measures of aberrant salience do, indeed, measure the same thing or relate to well-grounded measures of reinforcer sensitivity. Before discrepancies in schizophrenia research can be understood, it is important to ascertain the validity of aberrant salience measures in unaffected individuals. Therefore, our aim was to investigate the relationships among measures of aberrant salience, effort expenditure, and reinforcer sensitivity to better understand the construct validity of two prominent tests of aberrant salience:
The Salience Attribution Test (SAT; Roiser et al., 2009 ) and the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI; Cicero et al., 2010) .
The SAT is a computerised task that yields measures of implicit and explicit aberrant and adaptive salience. Implicit salience is inferred from response time differences across task conditions whereas explicit salience is based on awareness of predictors of reward. The ASI is a self-report measure of subjective experiences and beliefs attributed to aberrant salience. ASI scores correlate with psychotic experiences (Lelli et al., 2015) . Patients with schizophrenia and those identified as at-risk of psychosis have higher ASI ratings than control participants (Cicero et al., 2010) . , especially when the value and likelihood of rewards are higher (Fervaha, Graff-Guerrero, et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013; Reddy et al., 2015) . However, when reward value and likelihood are low, patients choose hard tasks more often Fervaha, Graff-Guerrero, et al., 2013) .
The SCT is grounded in reinforcer sensitivity theory (Corr, 2001; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004) , which explains variations in goal-directed behaviour in terms of the sensitivity of approach, avoidance, and conflict resolution systems (McNaughton & Corr, 2014) . The SCT provides indices of sensitivity of the responder to gain and loss outcomes under different conditions of approach and avoidance (Hall et al., 2011) . Previous research using SCT indicates that individuals tend to exhibit loss aversion and a stronger approach than avoidance tendency (Hall et al., 2011) .
We hypothesised that measures of aberrant salience would be positively correlated with each other, negatively related to effort in high-reward high-probability scenarios, and positively related to effort in low-reward low-probability scenarios. Given evidence of higher sensitivity to loss in schizophrenia (Scholten et al., 2006) , it was hypothesised that aberrant salience would predict an increase in sensitivity to loss relative to sensitivity to gain. We also expected that effort expenditure would predict greater approach versus avoidance tendencies under conditions of high-reward likelihood and value but predict greater gain sensitivity under conditions of low-reward likelihood and value. 
| Measures

| ASI
The ASI (Cicero et al., 2010) 
| EEfRT
The EEfRT (Treadway et al., 2009 ) is a computerised performance task that uses decision-making as a measure of motivation. The EEfRT consists of a series of trials in which the respondent must choose between undertaking a hard and an easy task, each of which is associated with different reward values. At the start of each trial, participants are advised the probability of winning (12%, 50%, or 88%) and the amount of reward for the decision alternatives. They are then to choose to complete either the easy or hard task. The easy task reward is set at $1 and requires participants to complete 30 button presses with the dominant index finger within 7s. The hard task reward varies between $1.24 and $4.30 and requires participants to complete 100 button presses with the nondominant little finger within 21s. Feedback at the end of each trial advises whether money was available for that trial and how much won.
The task runs for 20 minutes so the number of trials undertaken depends on the proportion of hard-versus easy-task decisions. For each trial, the probability of reinforcement and the reward value for the hard task vary. Over the task, the probabilities of reinforcement are equalised, with each possible combination of probability and reward value occurring at least once. The dependent variable is task choice.
Factor analysis of data collected from 94 schizophrenia patients on five motivational effort paradigms, including the EEfRT, revealed a single factor explained 53% of observed variance. The correlation between the factor score and EEfRT reward magnitude was strong (r = 0.66; Horan et al., 2015) .
| SAT
The SAT ) is a computerised learning paradigm that uses stimulus reinforcement to assess implicit and explicit aberrant and adaptive salience. The task consists of two 64-trial blocks. In each trial, a fixation cross appears centre screen. Then, after 1,000 ms, a line drawing of an object or animal appears in duplicate, centred above and below the fixation cross. A black box then replaces the fixation cross and participants are required to press a button as soon as the black box appears but before it disappears. After each trial, auditory and visual feedback indicate whether the trial was reinforced and the amount of money earned.
Participants are advised that reward is probabilistically related to the stimulus type whereas speed of response determines the amount of money that can be earned (between 10¢ and $1). Participants are assigned one of four possible contingencies that remain consistent throughout the task. The contingencies are whether the dimension of colour (red or blue) or shape (household object or animal) of the picture is relevant. For the task relevant dimension, one level (e.g., household object) has a high probability (87.5%) of being reinforced whereas the other (e.g., animal) has a low probability (12.5%). For the task irrelevant dimension, both levels (e.g., blue and red) have a 50% probability of being reinforced. Participants are instructed to try and identify which dimension yields the highest probability of reward. After each trial block, participants complete a visual analogue scale indicating how often (%) they believed each dimension was reinforced.
SAT output for each participant includes single measures for explicit and implicit adaptive salience and aberrant salience. Implicit salience is measured using response time (ms) whereas explicit salience is measured using a visual analogue scale rating (mm).
Adaptive salience is calculated as the difference between mean response time for low (10%; e.g., household object) versus high (90%; e.g., animal) reinforcement probability trials whereas aberrant salience was calculated as the absolute difference in mean response time between the two task-irrelevant dimensions (e.g., blue and red; Roiser et al., 2009 ).
In unaffected individuals, the SAT shows good discriminant validity. Implicit aberrant salience was independent of learned irrelevance, reinforcement sensitivity, working memory, and probabilistic learning (Schmidt & Roiser, 2009) . Although explicit measures were related to operant learning, explicit aberrant salience was not associated with schizotypy (Schmidt & Roiser, 2009 ).
| SCT
The SCT (Hall et al., 2011) is a computerised task that uses reinforcement to assess relative sensitivity to gain and loss and relative tendency to engage in approach and avoidance behaviour. In each of two phases of the task, participants start with a balance of $180 and are advised how much they can gain or lose at the start of each trial, with the probability of gain or loss fixed at 50%. The value of gain and loss is manipulated in increments of two between eight and zero. Feedback is provided by a change in the colour of the blue box (to red for loss, green for gain, and grey for no change) and the balance, which is presented next to the box.
As with the SAT, the rationale underlying the SCT is that response time will vary with the value a respondent gives to a trial outcome (Hall et al., 2011) . Behaviour on the SCT adheres to predictions based on the matching law (Hall et al., 2011) . Therefore, the matching law is used to estimate gain:loss sensitivity and approach:avoidance tendency ratios, using modelling with the Microsoft ® Excel Solver. Participants whose data does not conform to the matching law are excluded from further analysis.
| Procedure
Having provided written informed consent, participants completed a demographics questionnaire and the ASI followed by the three computerised tasks (EEfRT, SAT, and SCT). Computer tasks were administered in counterbalanced order across participants. Following completion of all the tasks, participants were debriefed, paid the money they won ($4 = NZ$1), and thanked for their time.
| Data analysis
For each participant, EEfRT effort was calculated as the proportion of hard task choices by dividing the number of hard task choices by the total number of trials (Treadway et al., 2009; Treadway & Zald, 2013; Wardle et al., 2011) . The number of hard choices for each probability level, each reward magnitude (≤$2, $2 to $3, and ≥ $3), and each probability-magnitude combination was divided by number of corresponding trials. The estimated value was calculated by multiplying probability by reward magnitude to provide the proportion of small (<1), medium ( ≥ 1 and <2), and large ( ≥ 2) estimated values for hard task choices.
Mixed effects modelling was used to calculate group and individual beta coefficients for models of EEfRT decisions. Modelling included random intercepts and random slopes for reward magnitude, probability, and cross level reward magnitude × probability interactions. For each participant, beta coefficients for reward magnitude, probability, and their interaction were calculated then linear modelling was used to assess whether the effect of these variables on task choice during EEfRT was related to measures of ASI, SAT, and SCT.
As assumptions of normality were not met, Kendall's tau was used for correlational analysis. Analysis was completed using the psych (Revelle, 2016) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) packages in R (R Development Core Team, 2016) and Hmisc (Harrell Jr et al., 2016) .
| RESULTS
Data from three participants were excluded from analyses because these participants demonstrated that they did not understand task requirements. Data from another four participants were excluded because of equipment failures. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics from the key measures.
SCT measures of interest were overall gain:loss and approach:
avoidance ratios, where a gain:loss ratio over one indicates reduced loss sensitivity and an approach:avoidance ratio over one indicates an approach tendency.
There was no evidence that ASI scores correlated with SAT indices of adaptive or aberrant salience, whether measured implicitly or explicitly, or with gain:loss or approach:avoidance ratios from the SCT (Table 2) . No significant correlations were found between SCT ratios and SAT indices (Table 2) . On the SAT, greater implicit aberrant salience predicted greater implicit adaptive salience. The relationships among ASI and SAT indices remained unchanged when analyses were restricted to those reporting no mental health issues (n = 69).
In the mixed effects modelling of EEfRT decisions, effort was predicted by the reward magnitude × probability interaction (ß = 1.89, z = 9.30, p < .001; Figures 1 and 2 ) but not by reward magnitude (ß = 0.04, z = 0.30, p = .77) or probability (ß = −1.15, z = −1.90, p = .06). Table 2 shows the correlation between measures of aberrant salience, effort, and SCT. There was a positive relationship between ASI ratings and effort at each level of the EEfRT variables except low probability. ASI positively correlated with effort for lower more likely rewards, higher less likely rewards, and with all reward magnitudes when the likelihood of winning was 50%. There was a negative relationship between SAT implicit aberrant salience and effort for larger more likely rewards. There were no significant correlations between effort expenditure and explicit aberrant salience. Higher implicit adaptive salience correlated with less effort for higher rewards and both low and high rewards when likelihood of winning was high.
The effects of probability on task choice during the EEfRT were predicted by ASI ratings, R 2 = 0.05, F(1, 80) = 4.56, p = .04. Evidence (15) 10 (18) Household income N (%) >200 k 8 (10) 5 (9) 101-150 23 (28) 15 (27) 76-100 k 20 (24) 15 (27) 51-75 k 14 (17) 12 (21) 26-50 k 7 (9) 4 (7) <25 k 1 (1) -
Mental health diagnosis N (%)
12 (15) Note. ASI = Aberrant Salience Inventory; SAT = Salience Attribution Test; SCT = Stimulus Chase Task. **p < .01.
[Correction added on 8 May 2018, after first online publication: Incorrect coefficients in Table 2 , row 7, variable "6.SCT approach:avoidance ratio", from column 2 (variable 1) and Table 3 , column 7, measure "Approach: Avoid", from row 1 (hard choices) have been corrected in this version.] that ASI ratings predicted the effects of reward magnitude, R 2 = 0.05, There was a positive relationship between SCT gain:loss ratio and
EEfRT effort for high rewards with a 50% probability of winning (Table 3) . When probability of winning was 50%, the relationship between gain:loss and effort for high reward magnitudes accounted for 49.9% of the variance, with 43.6% for medium reward and 24.2% for low reward. There was no evidence that linear EEfRT variable coefficients were significant predictors of gain:loss ratio.
| DISCUSSION
Contrary to our expectations, there was no evidence that measures of aberrant salience were correlated. Furthermore, measures of aberrant salience did not correlate with measures of reward sensitivity. Although aberrant salience correlated with EEfRT as hypothesised, ASI positively correlated with effort for small, improbable rewards whereas SAT implicit aberrant salience negatively correlated with willingness to exert effort for large, probable rewards. Effort was related to the SCT gain:
loss ratio in the direction hypothesised but only for uncertain rather than low-probability trials. Finally, there was no evidence of a relationship between effort and approach-avoidance behaviour.
The failure to find a relationship between the aberrant salience measures raises the question of validity of one or both measures. Previous research utilising the SAT has yielded inconsistent patterns of results in the sensitivity of explicit versus implicit aberrant salience to differentiate healthy participants from those on the schizophrenia spectrum (Pankow et al., 2015; Roiser et al., 2009; Roiser, Howes, Chaddock, Joyce, & McGuire, 2013) . Furthermore, evidence suggests that this cannot simply be attributed to differences in cognitive ability (Katthagen et al., 2016) . One issue with the SAT is the assumption that aberrant salience results in all irrelevant stimuli becoming salient. In contrast, higher ASI scores were associated with aberrant decision-making during the EEfRT that appears to be based on mental effort. For example, higher ASI was associated with hard task choice for high-value low-probability trials as well as high-probability lowvalue trials. The weight assigned to variables during EEfRT supports an association between ASI score and reduced mental effort. Overall, participants appeared to use combined reward magnitude and probability to determine task choice. However, participants with higher ASI scores were more likely to use probability alone in deciding task choice FIGURE 1 Beta coefficient for reward magnitude on task choice during Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task by probability of winning. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals FIGURE 2 Beta coefficient for probability of winning on task choice during Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task by reward magnitude. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals during the EEfRT. Task selection based on one of three probabilities arguably requires less mental effort than the evaluation of a combined probability and reward magnitude or even determining the subjective value of a continuous reward magnitude. The greater weight given to probability also explains the lack of evidence supporting the predicted negative relationship between ASI and hard task choices during highreward high-probability trials. These findings are interesting considering evidence from previous research suggesting an impaired cost-effort computation in schizophrenia and, overall, indicating that the ASI may be a more informative measure of aberrant salience than the SAT.
It is unclear whether the lack of evidence supporting a relationship between aberrant salience and loss sensitivity is due to the sample population or measures. However, evidence supported an association between reward sensitivity and reward motivation. Given that the SCT outcome probability is constant (50%) and the EEfRT does not include loss (deduction of reward) outcomes, the correlations between the gain:loss ratio and hard task choice during 50% probability EEfRT trials suggest an increased gain sensitivity rather than loss sensitivity.
The results, therefore, indicate that higher gain sensitivity is related to increased willingness to expend effort for higher value rewards.
Although a healthy sample was required to ascertain baseline relationships between the measures, this is one of the key limitations of the study. The current evidence suggests no relationship between the measures of aberrant salience. One explanation for the null relationship is that the different constructs of aberrant salience, employed by the SAT and ASI, are associated with differences in sensitivity. Therefore, although the current study had adequate power, a case-control design may show a relationship between these measures that was masked by a restricted range of scores from the student sample. Interpretation of the results within the framework of an association between aberrant salience and schizophrenia should, therefore, be cautiously applied. Finally, it is important to note that the current findings may have wider implications. Although the aberrant salience hypothesis has been applied to schizophrenia, reward processing is affected in other disorders and diseases, such as Parkinson's disease and addictions. Thus, research is needed to ascertain whether the aberrant salience hypothesis is unique to schizophrenia.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the volunteers who contributed to this research as well as for the advice from Prof. Neil McNaughton on the Stimulus Note. L = low; M = medium; H = high; Pr = probability; $ = reward magnitude; EV = expected value; ASI = Aberrant Salience Inventory Score. EEfRT tasks are based on proportion of hard task choices for three Pr levels (L = .12, M = .5, H = .88); for three levels of RM (<$2.00, $2.00 to $3.00, ≥ $3.00). EV = Pr × $.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
